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Abstract. This paper provides a robust epistemic foundation for predict-
ing and implementing collective actions when only the proportions that take
specific actions in the population matter. We apply ∆-rationalizability to ana-
lyze strategic sophistication entailed in (structural) quantal response equilib-
rium (QRE); the former is called ∆(p)-rationalization to emphasize the only
requirement on first-order beliefs is that they should be consistent with the
transparent knowledge of the distributions of errors in the population. We
show that each QRE is a ∆(p)-rationalizable outcome. We also give conditions
under which the converse also holds, and prove that the condition is almost
never satisfied in generic games. It implies that QRE may be too demanding
as a predictor in general, and ∆(p)-rationalizable outcomes can be a robust
benchmark to start from.
1 Introduction
Policy-making needs prediction and implementation of collective actions. Sometimes,
they concern only the proportion in a population instead of choices in the individual
level; the circumstance may be uncommon so that no extant data are directly applicable,
for example, the voluntary vaccination rate in the outbreak of a new pandemic. A model
thrivingly used in the empirical literature is proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey [19] (re-
ferred as MP in the following). There, the population is decomposed into groups, each
having representative payoffs. An individual has her idiosyncrasy, or payoff type, which
influences her payoffs and is known to her only; the distributions of the idiosyncrasies
are publicly known. MP introduced a solution concept called quantal response equilibrium
(QRE), which is a probabilistic summary based on the commonly known idiosyncrasies
distributions of pure-strategic optimal action under each type given the distribution of
actions among other groups.1
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However, QRE may not necessarily fit the problem here. In general, achieving an equi-
librium requires players’ common correct beliefs about each other (Tan and Werlang [29],
Aumann and Brandenburger [2], Polak [25], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [5]), yet correct be-
liefs are hardly guaranteed, especially in an unprecedented circumstance. An alternative
is rationalizability (Bernheim [7], Pearce [24]): when a player is ignorant about others’
behaviors, she can only rely on her individual rationality, i.e., “making a choice which is
justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs” (Bernheim [7], p.1007). Battigalli
and Siniscalchi [5] generalize this idea into games with incomplete information. Their
∆-rationalization is a framework to study behavioral consequences under some explicit
restrictions on the commonly known content of first-order beliefs without constraining
the possible epistemic types à la Harsanyi [13]; in other words, it characterizes robustness
in the sense of Bergemann and Morris [6].
In this paper, we apply ∆-rationalization into MP’s model. Instead of focusing on the
classic rationalizable actions/strategies, we turn to rationalizable outcomes, i.e., distribu-
tions over actions resulting from distributions over errors and the rationalization proce-
dure. By doing this, we make explicitly the epistemic structure behind the individual
reasoning procedure that QRE entails. Since the model assumes that the distributions of
the idiosyncrasies are publicly known, the only restriction on an individual’s initial belief
about her opponents is that the marginal distribution on their types should coincide with
it; there is no conditions on people’ beliefs on others’ behavior or the correlation between
types and choices. Yet if the type spaces are large enough, that restriction leads to deter-
minate choices under some types. Given the distribution over types, the consequence is
an infimum of the proportion that some action is used. This updates the restriction on be-
liefs, and leads to a new infimum, etc. Finally, the iterative procedure of ∆-rationalization
results in a limit of the infimums of the proportion that each action is adopted, which can
be a benchmark for the estimation aforementioned.
As an illustration, suppose that a policymaker is considering whether the size of popu-
lation who will voluntarily get vaccinated in a community is above the threshold of herd
immunity. The situation is described as the game in Table 1: the population is separated
into two groups, the row is more vulnerable than the column (for example, they corre-
spond to the senior and younger citizens or the health-care workers and people outside
the medical systems, respectively).
Not vaccinated Vaccinated
Not vaccinated 0, 1 7, 2
Vaccinated 1, 16 3, 4
Table 1: A game of spontaneous vaccination
Due to the cost (e.g., risk of side effects and the time spent on administrative processes),
a representative player would prefer others to get vaccinated and reduce the chance of
virus spreading. Yet because of the difference in vulnerability, the benefits of “free-riding”
are asymmetric. Each individual has some idiosyncrasies (e.g., having some underlying
health condition which makes her eager to get a vaccinated, or feeling distrustful of vacci-
nation due to some personal trauma) described as a real-valued random variable for each
2
action.
Suppose that idiosyncrasies are independent and each has an extreme value distribu-
tion with parameter λ = 0.5, i.e., the cdf Fi(θik) = exp(− exp(−0.5θik)) for each i ∈ {row,
column} and k ∈ {Not Vaccinated, Vaccinated}. The infimum-updating process is il-









→ 0.032 as n → ∞, which coincides with the unique QRE in this game. In
other words, given that the distributions of types and people’s rationality are commonly
known, intrapersonal reasoning alone leads to the QRE outcome. This provides a robust
epistemic foundation for using QRE as a predictor in this case.
Figure 1: The convergence of lower bounds for each action
This paper discusses the general relationship between QRE and the reasoning struc-
ture; the latter is called ∆(p)-rationalization procedure to emphasize p, the distribution
of idiosyncrasies, which is the only restriction on people’s beliefs that does not concern
the classic rationality, in the framework of ∆-rationalization. Theorem 1 shows that every
QRE is a ∆(p)-rationalizable outcome, that is, given a QRE π, among the type-action pairs
surviving the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure, each type can be associated with an action
optimal at it under a belief consistent with the transparent knowledge of p, the distribu-
tion of types, and rationality, such that based on p, the distribution on actions coincide
with q.
However, not every ∆(p)-rationalization procedure converges to a QRE as it does in
the above example. Theorem 2 gives a sufficient condition on payoff structures for the
convergence; further, they are necessary when there are multiple QREs. In 2× 2 cases,
they characterize a subset of games that are intensively studied in the literature. However,
they are almost never satisfied in general cases. Therefore, QRE may be too demanding
as a predictor in general, and the limit infimum generated by the ∆(p)-rationalization
procedure can be a robust benchmark to start from.
Our results may be seen as providing an epistemic foundation for applying QRE in
empirical research. Also, it provides a method to test the hierarchical belief assumption
in epistemic game theory. By generating a distributions of a real-valued error for each
action in addition to a game (with representative payoff values), at each level in the belief
hierarchy, a point in the error space of a player is associated to a subset of “consistent”
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actions. Graphs depicting the change of the association is shown in Figure 3. Compari-
son between the theoretical prediction and the actual behavior in the laboratory may help
to determine the depths of reasoning in a population and their relationship with the nu-
merical values of the error, i.e., the payoff types. The QRE-inspired setting provides a
baseline (i.e., common knowledge of the distributions of errors) for reasoning strategic
uncertainty, which is different from Kosenkova [16]’s nonparametric inference about to
quantify strategic sophistication (k-rationalizability) in first-price auctions.
1.1 Literature
As mentioned in Footnote 1, there are two versions of QRE in the literature. The original
one is given in MP, which is renamed as structural QRE (sQRE) in Goeree et al [11]. MP
generates McFadden [18]’s qualitative choice behavior model into quantal (i.e., discrete)
choices in a game-theoretic framework for estimation using field and experimental data.
MP adopts a large-population (or Nash’s mass action) scenario with private information.
Each player is interpreted as a large population; the payoffs reflect “representative” or
“typical” preferences of each population, while an individual may have some “idiosyn-
crasies” for each action,2 and those idiosyncrasies follow a fixed (joint) distribution in
the population. A sQRE is a profile of probability measures over actions generated from
some Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with common prior on the idiosyncrasies.
Another version of QRE is introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey [20]. They use an ax-
iomatic method to define quantal response functions, which describe players’ disturbed
reactions to others’ (mixed) strategies, and the equilibrium is a fixed-point in the system.
Later, it is renamed as regular QRE (rQRE) in Goeree et al [11].
McKelvey and Palfrey [20] claimed that the two definitions are equivalent and struc-
tural QRE is the foundation of regular QRE. Since then, researches applying QRE with-
out distinguishing the two versions to interpreting observed behavior in various fields
flourishes (see Goeree et al [12] for a survey). However, Haile et al. [15] questioned the
empirical content of (structural) QRE by showing that sQRE is not falsifiable in any static
game. This forces researchers to differentiate the two QREs explicitly. One solution is
provided by Goeree et al [11], which redefined rQRE by putting additional restrictions
on the quantal response functions and showed that some rQRE cannot be modeled as a
sQRE and rQRE have empirical content.3
From the decision-theoretical viewpoint , the two QREs correspond to the two models
interpreting the phenomenon that in a population, the subjects’ responses over the set
A of alternatives to the same choice situation is governed by a probability mechanism π
(see Section 5 in Luce and Suppes [17] for a survey). Structural QRE corresponds to the
random utility model, where the utility function is selected according to some probability
mechanism p, i.e., π(ak) = p[Uk ≥ Ut for each t 6= k]. Regular QRE corresponds to the
constant utility model, where the utility function is fixed and the response probability is a
function of it; formally, there is a fixed utility profile u = (u(a))a∈A ∈ RA and a function
2This differentiates MP’s model from Harsanyi [14]’s games with randomly disturbed payoffs. The latter
associates a random error to each profile of actions.
3A working paper version of Haile et al. [15] appeared in 2004.
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R from RA to the set of all probability measures over A such that π = R(u).
The two models are based on different assumptions on each decision-maker’s rational-
ity. The random utility model assumes that an individual’s behavior is optimal to her
belief (i.e.,“rational”). In contrast, the constant utility model allows bounded rationality
(e.g., “trembling hands” in the sense of Selten [28]). This distinction is not emphasized
sufficiently in the literature, which may lead to conceptual problems.
As an example, consider Goeree and Holt [10]’s noisy introspection (NI). NI can be
taken as a quantal-response version of rationalization procedure; roughly speaking, it
is a hierarchical belief structure such that the higher the order is, the more random the
response is supposed to be. With the assumption that the idiosyncrasies have extreme
value distribution with some parameter λ, NI is formulated as a sequence (λn)n∈N with
limn→∞ λn = 0, where each λn represents the randomness of the response in the n-th
order belief.
NI is about rQRE, not sQRE. Because if it were the latter, the distribution of idiosyn-
crasies should be transparent and commonly known (as implied in the definition given in
MP); therefore, λ has no reason to vary along the belief hierarchies. The sequence (λn)n∈N
can only be interpreted as due to individuals’ bounded rationality: as the reasoning goes
deeper, it is easier to make mistakes and harder to accurately predict others’ behavior. In
this vein, our research can be seen as a exploration of rationalization based on sQRE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides preliminaries about
sQRE. Section 3 introduces ∆(p)-rationalization procedure; we use some example to show
how it works. Section 4 contains the main results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Quantal response equilibrium
In this paper, we focus on structural quantal response equilibrium (sQRE). In the follow-
ing, for simplicity, we omit “structural” and call it QRE when no confusion is caused.
We start from a definition more general than the one given in McKelvey and Palfrey [19]
(referred to as MP in the following).
Let G = 〈I, (Aj, uj)j∈I〉 be a static game, where I is the finite set of players and for each
i ∈ I, Ai = {ai1, ..., aiKi}with Ki ≥ 2 is the set of actions and ui : A(:= ∏j∈I Aj)→ R is the
von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff function of player i. We adopt a large-populaton sce-
nario, where each player i ∈ I is interpreted as a population and ui the “representative”
preferences of the population; in addition, there is a random variable reflecting individu-
als’ idiosyncrasies toward each action. Formally, let Θi = RAi for each i ∈ I, Θ = ∏j∈I Θj,
and p a probability distribution on Θ. For each π = (πj)j∈I ∈ ∏j∈I ∆(Aj), each i ∈ I, and
each k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, we define
Eik(π) = {(θit)Kit=1 ∈ Θi : ui(aik, π−i) + θik ≥ ui(ai`, π−i) + θi` for all ` = 1, ..., Ki}.
That is, Eik(π) is the set of realization of θi under which aik is a best response.
Definition 1. A mixed-strategy profile π∗ = (π∗j )j∈I ∈ ∏j∈I ∆(Aj) is called a quantal re-
sponse equilibrium (QRE) under 〈G, (Θj)j∈I , p〉 iff for each i ∈ I and each k ∈ {1, ..., Ki},
π∗i (aik) = pi(Eik(π
∗)) .
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Since π∗i is a probability distribution, the following observation holds.
Observation 1. If π∗ is a QRE, then for each i ∈ I and k, ` ∈ {1, ..., Ki} with k 6= `,
pi(Eik(π∗) ∩ Ei`(π∗)) = 0.
Observation 1 suggests that, under our definition, given a static game and p, QRE may
not exist. The following example gives an illustration.
Example 1. Consider the two-person game in Table 2. Let pi be the Dirac measure on
{(0, 0)}, i = 1, 2. This game has no QRE. Indeed, for each π2 ∈ ∆(A2), p1(E1H(π) ∩
E1T(π)) = 1 > 0, which violates Observation 1. N
H T
H 1,−1 1, 1
T 1, 1 1,−1
Table 2: Example 1
To guarantee the existence of a QRE, some restrictions are needed. MP requires p to be
admissible, i.e., for each i, pi has a density function fi such that the marginal distribution
of fi exists for each θik, k = 1, ..., Ki and E fi(θi) = 0. In our paper, some results (e.g.,
Theorem 2) requires that fi to be continuous and have the full support (i.e., supp fi =
Θi) while dispenses with restrictions on E fi(θi). By Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, QRE
exists under both conditions.
Example 2. When p has an extreme value distribution with parameter λ ≥ 0, for each





This is a logistic quantal response function, one of the most popular model in the literature.
MP shows that when λ→ ∞, the corresponding QREs converge to a Nash equilibrium of
G. N
3 ∆-Rationalizability and QRE
3.1 Definitions
We can take Θ as the set of payoff types. By integrating it into the “representative”
model, we obtain a game with incomplete information. Formally, given a static game
G = 〈I, (Aj, uj)j∈I〉 and Θ = ∏j∈I Θi = ∏j∈I RAj , the game of incomplete information based
on G is a tuple
Γ(G) = 〈I, (Aj, Θj, Uj)j∈I〉,
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where for each θ = (θj)j∈I ∈ Θ, a = (ajkj)j∈I ∈ A, and i ∈ I, Ui(θ, a) = ui(a) + θiki . Since
player i’s payoff is only influence by her own payoff type θi, this is a game with private
value.
Let p be a probability measure on Θ. We now have to incorporate p into this framework.
At first glance, it looks like that no one needs to know p. Indeed, for each i ∈ I, an indi-
vidual in population i even does not need to know pi; if she knows π∗−i, she just chooses
a best response in Ai based on the realization of her payoff types. However, achieving
an equilibrium requires individual’s common correct beliefs about others’ behavior (Tan
and Werlang [29], Aumann and Brandenburger [2], Polak [25]), and justification of π∗−i
needs the knowledge of the distribution of p on Θ−i conditional on each θi ∈ Θi. This is
a transparent restriction on each individual’s first-order beliefs. Formally, for each i ∈ I
and θi ∈ Θi, the set of beliefs at θi consistent with p is
∆θi(p) = {µi ∈ ∆(Θ−i × A−i) : margΘ−i µ
i = p(·|θi)}. (1)
Here, µi is a belief about the types and actions of i’s opponents under payoff type θi.
There is no restriction on the joint distribution; the only requirement is that µi’s marginal
distribution on Θ−i should coincides with the distribution of p on Θ−i conditional on θi.
When pi’s are independent, µi ∈ ∆θi(p) if and only if margΘ−i µ
i = p−i = ∏j 6=i pj. Def-
inition 1 suggests that p−i does not vary along θi, otherwise the opponents’ distributions
may not be stable as π∗−i. Hence we focus on cases with independent (pj)j∈I .
Definition 2. Consider the following procedure, called ∆(p)-rationalization procedure:
Step 0. For each i ∈ I, Σ0i,∆(p) = Θi × Ai,
Step n + 1. For each i = 1, 2 and each (θi, ai) ∈ Θi × Ai with (θi, ai) ∈ Σni,∆(p), (θi, ai) ∈
Σn+1i,∆(p) iff the there is some µ
i ∈ ∆θi(p) such that
1. ai is a best response to µi under θi, and
2. µi(Σn−i,∆(p)) = 1, where Σ
n
−i,∆(p) := ∏j 6=i Σ
n
j,∆(p).
Finally, let Σ∞i,∆(p) = ∩n≥0Σ
n
i,∆(p) for i = 1, 2.
∆(p)-rationalization procedure is a special case of Battigalli and Siniscalchi [5]’s ∆-
rationalization procedure; p emphasizes that the restriction on the first-order belief is
given by p as defined in (1). This procedure iteratively removes (θi, ai) where ai cannot be
rationalized under θi by any belief in ∆θi(p) supported by the outcomes in the previous
stage. Finally, every (θi, ai) ∈ Σ∞i,∆(p) is rationalizable based on common knowledge of
rationality and the transparent restriction in (1).
Figure 2 illustrates how this procedure works on a game with Ai = {T, U} for some
player i ∈ I. Suppose that pj’s are independent and the square (a subset of RAi) is the
support of pi. Since Σ0i,∆(p) = Θi× Ai, the support of others’ belief about i can be arbitrary;
on the left-hand side of Figure 2 we list four candidates. However, under some type
θi ∈ Θi, whatever i’s belief µi is, the best response can only be T (or U). Definition 2
implies that Σ1i,∆(p) may look like something on the right-hand side of Figure 2, which
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Figure 2: A ∆(p)-rationalizability procedure
impose restrictions on other players’ second order belief about i (the white area are still
“free”, that is, under each payoff type the best response can be both T and U, depending
on the belief). Since the marginal distribution of those beliefs on Θi should coincide with
pi, it implies that the first step of the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure generates infimums
for the probabilities that T and U are used. Repeating this argument, we can see that
the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure generates sequences for the infimums of T and U,
respectively. The next subsection gives several numerical examples to show how those
sequences behave.
The literature of rationalization used to focus on rationalizable (pure) actions (see Bat-
tigalli and Bonanno [3], Perea [23], Dekel and Siniscalchi [9], and Battigalli et al. [4] for
surveys). In the literature of QRE, it is usually assumed that each pi has a full support.
Under this assumption, every action is rationalizable, which makes rationalizable actions
less attractive. Instead, here our focus is rationalizable outcomes, which means a profile of
distributions on Ai’s such that each is supportable by Σ∞i,∆(p). The formal definition is as
follows.
Definition 3. A probability measure πi ∈ ∆(Ai) is called a ∆(p)-rationalizable distribution
for (the population of) player i iff there is a measurable si : Θi → Ai such that
1. pi[s−1i (ai)] = πi(ai), and
2. (θi, si(θi)) ∈ Σ∞i,∆(p).
A profile π∗j ∈ ∏j∈I ∆(Aj) is called a ∆(p)-rationalizable outcome iff each πi (i ∈ I) is
∆(p)-rationalizable distribution.
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Our examples in the next subsections will illustrate what ∆(p)-rationalizable distri-
butions and outcomes look like and how they are connected with the aforementioned
sequences of infimums.
3.2 Examples
Example 3. Consider the game G in Table 3 and the p = p1 × p2, where each pi is
the uniform distribution on ([−2, 2] × [−2, 2]). The unique QRE of this game is π∗ =
(0.5H + 0.5T, 0.5H + 0.5T), which coincides with the Nash equilibrium. Further, we show
that, for each i = 1, 2, the only ∆(p)-rationalizable distribution is π∗i . In other words,
∆(p)-rationalization procedure converges to π∗.
H T
H 1, 0 0, 1
T 0, 1 1, 0
Table 3: Example 3
Figure 3: The ∆(p)-rationalization procedure converges to the QRE
First, let i ∈ I and θi = (θiH, θiT) ∈ Θi. Then (θi, H) ∈ Σ1i,∆(p) if and only if for some
πH + (1− π)T ∈ ∆(A−i), π(1 + θiH) + (1− π)θiT ≥ πθiT + (1− π)(1 + θiT), or, equiva-
lently
θiH − θiT ≥ 1− 2π (2)
Since π ∈ [0, 1], it follows that when θiH − θiT ≥ 1− 2× 0 = 1, definitely (θi, H) ∈ Σ1i,∆(p).
Therefore, the types in the green area in in Figure 3 (1) can only be associated with H in
each player’s second-order belief. Similarly, when θiH − θiT ≤ 1− 2× 1 = −1, definitely
(θi, T) ∈ Σ1i,∆(p); this is depicted by the red area in Figure 3 (1). Therefore, the types in the
green area in in Figure 3 (1) can only be associated with H . Every type in between them
(i.e., in the white area) can be associated with both H and T. Therefore, the measures of
the green and red areas provide the infimums of the probabilities that each action is used
in players’ second-order beliefs
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To be more specific, note that the probability measure of each area is 932 . It means that to
satisfy µi ∈ ∆θi(p) and µi(Σ1−i,∆(p)) = 1, both margA−i µ
i(H) and margA−i µ
i(T) are at least
9




32 . Under this new
restriction, inequality (2) implies that when θiH − θiT ≥ 1− 2× 932 =
7
16 , (θi, H) ∈ Σ2i,∆(p).
Similarly, when θiH − θiT ≤ 1 − 2 × 2332 = −
7
16 , (θi, T) ∈ Σ2i,∆(p). Those areas are the
green and red ones in Figure 3 (2). Now π gains new restrictions and its range becomes
narrower. In the same vein, the range of π derived from Σ2i,∆(p) is shown in Figure 3 (3).
In general, let πn and πn be the infimum and the supremum of the probability of using
H at step n (i.e., the greatest lower bound and the lest upper bound of the range of π in
inequality (2)). By mathematical induction, we can show that (a) πn + πn = 1, (b) πn ≤
1
2 ≤ π
n, and (c) (πn)n is non-decreasing and (πn)n is non-increasing. The measure of the
area in Θi which is only associated to H is
(3+2πn)2
32 and the measure of the area for T is
(5−2πn)2
32 . Since, by inductive hypothesis, π













Hence (a) - (c) hold. Due to (b) and (c), both (πn) and (πn) converge and limn→∞ πn ≤
1
2 ≤ limn→∞ π
n. Further, (a) implies that limn→∞ πn = limn→∞ πn = 12 . N
Since the QRE in Example 3 coincides with the Nash equilibrium, one may conjecture
that the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure converges to the latter as well. The following
example shows that it is not the case.
Example 4. Consider the game in Table 4.4 We assume that each θik has the extreme value
distribution with λ = 10. Note that for each α, β ∈ [0, 1], (αU + (1− α)D, βL + (1− β)R)
is a Nash equilibrium. The only perfect equilibrium is (D, R). In contrast, the unique
QRE is approximately (0.5U + 0.5D, 0.5L + 0.5R). We show that the ∆(p)-rationalization
procedure converges to the QRE.
L C R
U 1, 1 0, 0 1, 1
M 0, 0 0, 0 0, 5
D 1, 1 5, 0 1, 1
Table 4: Example 4
Let player 1’s belief about player 2’s behavior π2 = p2L + q2C + (1− p2 − q2)R. The
probabilities that player 1’s best response is U, M, or D are
p1(R1U(π)) =
e10(1−q2)
e10(1−q2) + 1 + e10(1+4q2)
(3)








e10(1−q2) + 1 + e10(1+4q2)
(5)
All of the functions rely upon q only. Since the game is symmetric, given player 2’s belief
about player 1 is π1 = p1U + q1M + (1 − p1 − q1)D, the probabilities that player 2’s
best response is L, C, R are obtained from (3) - (5) by replacing q2 with q1, respectively.
Therefore, q1 = q2 in the QRE, or, equivalently, q = q1 = q2 is a fixed point of (4). So, we
only need to study the behavior of q1 and q2 in the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure. We
rephrase (4) as a one-variable function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that for each q ∈ [0, 1],
f (q) =
1
e10(1−q) + 1 + e10(1+4q)
.
Consider the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure. We use qn
i
and qni to denote the infimum
and the supremum of qi, i = 1, 2. In the first step, each qi can be any number in [0, 1], so
q0
i
= 0 and q0i = 1 for i = 1, 2. Since f is decreasing on [0, 1], it follows that q
1
i
= f (q0−i) =
f (q0i ) and q
1
i = f (q
0
−i) = f (q
0
i
). The same argument implies that for each n ∈N,
qn+1
i
= f (qni ) and q
n+1




Since | f ′(x)| < 1 on [0, 1], f is a contraction mapping on a compact set in R. Hence
the process in (6) converges to the unique fixed point of f on [0, 1], i.e., the probability
of using M and C in QRE. Therefore, the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure converges to the
QRE. N
The following example differs from the previous two since, as the parameter varies,
there may be multiple QREs. We apply the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure on the game
with different parameter values and see what kind of distributions are ∆(p)-rationalizable.
It will provide some hint for the main results in the next section.
Example 5. Consider the vaccination game in Section 1, whose game matrix is reposted
in Table 5. From the viewpoint of QRE (and ∆(p)-rationalization procedure) this game is
equivalent to the asymmetric chicken game studied in Goeree et al. [12] (pp. 25-26). Here,
as in Section 1, we follow them and assume that each Θi = R2 and θik’s are independent
and has an extreme value distribution with parameter λ. The relationship between QREs
and the value of λ is summarized in Figure 2, which is a copy of Figure 2.4 in Goeree et al.
[12], p.25. When λ is small, e.g., λ = 1/2 (i.e.,λ/(1 + λ) = 1/3), there is a unique QRE;
while for big values of λ, e.g., λ = 4 (i.e., λ/(1 + λ) = 0.8), there are multiple QREs. We
choose these two values of λ and see what outcomes the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure
generates.
We use qnik to denote the infimum of the probability that player i uses action k at round














T 0, 0 7, 2
S 1, 14 3, 4
Table 5: Example 5











When λ = 1/2, they converges to the unique QRE. The convergence process has been
shown in Figure 1. The speed is relatively fast: in less than 15 steps, all qnik’s are quite
close to the limit. When λ = 4, qn1T → 0.018, qn1S → 1.613× 10−7, qn2T → 3.63× 10−21,
and qn2S → 0.018 as n → ∞; by looking at Figure 4, one may notice that when λ = 4, the
game has multiple QREs, and each qnik converges to the smallest probability that action k
of player i is used in all QREs. N
One may imply from the above examples that ∆(p)-rationalization procedure “con-
verges” to QRE. To be specific, the infimum of the probability that an action is used in
all ∆(p)-rationalizable outcomes seems coincide with the infimum of the probability the
action is used in all QRE; especially, when the QRE is unique, the ∆(p)-rationalization
procedure seems to converge to the QRE. This conjecture is rejected by the following ex-
ample.
Example 6. Consider the asymmetric Matching-Pennies style game in Table 6. Here,
p =
⊗
i=1,2;k=H,T pik, where each pik is the extreme value distribution with λ = 5.
This game has only one QRE (see Goeree et al. [12], Chapter 2.2). The recursive func-
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H T
H 9, 0 0, 1
T 0, 1 1, 0
Table 6: Example 6
























Through some calculation, it can be seen that
qn1H → 0.00932805, qn1T → 1.2467× 10−24, qn2H → 0.006692805, qn2T → 0.0073424,
which is not a QRE since the sum of each pair is strictly less than 1. Actually, this is a
fixed point of the system of equations in (7) near 0.5 N
The relationship between ∆(p)-rationalization procedure and QRE will be intensively
investigated in the next section.
4 Relations between QRE and ∆(p)-rationalizability
4.1 QRE→ ∆(p)-rationalizability
Our first result is that every QRE is a ∆(p)-rationalizable outcome, or, equivalently, each
QRE mixed strategy is a ∆(p)-rationalizable distribution. This can be seen as the parallel
of the classic result that every Nash equilibrium action is rationalizable (see Bernheim
[7]).
Theorem 1. Consider a static game G = 〈I, (Aj, uj)j∈I〉 and 〈(Θj)j∈I , p〉 with pj’s independent.
Each QRE is a ∆(p)-rationalizable outcome.
Proof. Let π = (πj)j∈I be a QRE under 〈G, (Θj)j∈I , p〉. We will construct a a profile of
random variables (sj : Θj → Aj)j∈I such that that for each i ∈ I, pi(s−1i (ai)) = πi(ai) for
each ai ∈ Ai and (θi, si(θi)) ∈ ∑∞i,∆(p) for each θi ∈ Θi.
Recall that for each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, Eik(π) is the set of θi’s under which aik
is a best response to π−i. For each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi, we define Aπi (θi) = {aik ∈ Ai :
θi ∈ Eik(π)}, i.e., the set of best responses of player i again π−i under θi. We consider
a mapping si : Θi → Ai such that si(θi) ∈ Aπi . Note that for a “boundary” θi, i.e.,
|Aπi (θi)| > 1, si(θi) can be any action in Aπi (θi); this does not cause any problem since,
due to Observation 1, those “boundary” states form a null set with respect to pi.
5The numerical calculation in Examples 5 and 6 are carried out by Mathematica. Codes are available under
request.
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Since π is a QRE, for each i ∈ I and aik ∈ Ai, pi(s−1i (aik)) = pi(Eik) = πi(aik). We
then have to show that for each i ∈ I, (θi, si(θi)) ∈ ∑∞i,∆(p) for each θi ∈ Θi. First, by
definition, (θi, si(θi)) ∈ ∑0i,∆(p) for each i ∈ I and θi ∈ Θi. Suppose the statement holds for
some n ≥ 0. For each i ∈ I, let µi be the distribution over Θ−i × A−i such that for each
measurable E ⊆ Θ−i × A−i, µi(E) = ∏j 6=i pj({θj ∈ Θj : (θj, sj(θj)) ∈ ProjjE}). By the
definition of sj’s, for each a−i = (aj)j 6=i, (margA−i µ
i)(a−i) = ∏j 6=i pj(s
−1
i (ai)) = π−i(a−i).
Since π is a QRE, θi ∈ Ei,si(θi), and consequently si(θi) is a best response to µ
i under θi.
Hence (θi, si(θi)) ∈ ∑n+1i,∆(p). Here we have shown that (θi, si(θi)) ∈ ∑
∞
i,∆(p) for each i ∈ I
and θi ∈ Θi.
4.2 ∆(p)-rationalizability→ QRE
Examples in Section 3.2 suggest that the converse of Theorem 1 may hold under some
condition. As remarked after Example 5, it seems that the infimum of the probability
that an action is used in all ∆(p)-rationalizable distributions coincide with the infimum
of the probability the action is used in all QRE. This subsection is devoted to exploring
this conjecture.
We first have to formulate the conjecture. Consider a static game G = 〈I, (Aj, uj)j∈I〉
and 〈(Θj)j∈I , p〉. In this subsection, we assume that pj’s are independent and for each i ∈
I, pi has a continuous density function fi which has the full support (i.e., supp fi = RAi).
We use Q(G, p) to denote the set of QREs. Brouwer’s fixed point theorem guarantees that
Q(G, p) 6= ∅. For each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, we define
q
ik
= inf{qi(aik) : qi ∈ Proj∆(Ai)Q(G, p)}.
For each i ∈ I, we use Si to denote the set of all random variables si : Θi → Ai. For
each n ≥ 0, let Sni = {si ∈ Si : (θi, si(θi)) ∈ ∑
n
i,∆(p) for each θi ∈ Θi}, i.e., the “restriction”
of Si on the n-th order ∆(p)-rationality. For each k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, we define
qnik = inf{pi(s
−1
i (aik)) : si ∈ S
n
i } (8)
As in Section 3.2, qnik is interpreted as the infimum of the probability that i uses action aik
in step n of the ∆(p)-rationalization process. It is clear that q0ik = 0 since ∑
0
i,∆(p) = Θi × Ai
and the random variable si which assigns ait (t 6= k) to each θi is in S0i .
The investigation is decomposed into the following three steps:
(a) We show that for each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, the sequence (qnik)n is bounded and




ik. Also, for each
i ∈ I and n ∈N, ∑Kik=1 q
n





(b) We show that for each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, q∗ik ≤ qik .
(c) We gives a sufficient condition, under which for each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, q∗ik is
the probability that action aik is used in some QRE. Note that for t 6= s, q∗it and q∗is
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may correspond to different QREs. In addition, we show that when |Q(G, p)| > 1,
the condition is also necessary.
Section 4.2.1 shows (a) (Proposition 1) and (b) (Proposition 2). Section 4.2.2 gives the
condition in (c) (Theorem 2). Section 4.2.3 discusses how strict the condition is.
4.2.1 Properties of the infimum sequences
Proposition 1. For each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, the sequence (qnik)n is bounded and non-








Proof. We first show the statement for 2× 2 games and then generalize the idea arbitrary
cases.
L R
T α1, α2 β1, β2
U γ1, γ2 δ1, δ2
Table 7: A 2× 2 game
For each i ∈ I and s, t ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, we let H
ts
i = maxa−i∈A−i(ui(ais, a−i)− ui(ait, a−i))
and Htsi = mina−i∈A−i(ui(ais, a−i) − ui(ait, a−i)). It is easy to see that H
st
i = −Htsi , or,




i ’s are the pillars to determine the area in Θi that “definitely”
associated with t in each step of the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure.
Consider the game in Table 5. Without loss of generality, assume that HTU1 = γ1− α1 ≥
HTU1 = δ1 − β1 and H
LR
2 = β2 − α2 ≥ HLR2 = δ2 − γ2. We take player 1’s viewpoint. For
player 1’s belief qL + (1− q)R, q ∈ [0, 1], about player 2, at each θ1 = (θ1T, θ1U) satisfying
qα1 + (1− q)β1 + θ1T ≥ qγ1 + (1− q)δ1 + θ1U, i.e., θ1T − θ1U ≥ q(γ1 − α1) + (1− q)(δ1 −
β1), player 1 would choose T. Since q ∈ [0, 1], when θ1T − θ1U ≥ maxq∈[0,1][q(γ1 − α1) +
(1− q)(δ1 − β1)] = γ1 − α1 = H
TU
1 , i.e., when







player 1 should choose T. We use E1TU to denote the set of θ1’s satisfying (9). Therefore,
for every interior θ1 ∈ E1TU (i.e., the strict inequality holds for θ1 in (9)) (θ1, U) /∈ ∑
1
1,∆(p).
Note that since p1 is absolutely continuous, for those boundary θ1’s, though (θ1, U) still in
∑11,∆(p), they have no essential influence to the outcome. This argument implies that, for
any s1 : Θ1 → A1 ∈ S11 , p1(s
−1
1 (T)) ≥ p1(E1TU). Also, it is easy to see that for all θ1 /∈ E1TU,
(θ1, U) ∈ ∑11,∆(p) because they can be supported by some belief µ1. Therefore,
q11T = p1(E
1








In the same vein, we can see that
q11U = p1[θ1T − θ1U ≤ q02LH
TU
1 + (1− q02L)HTU1 ],







q12R = p2[θ2L − θ2R ≤ q01T H
LR
2 + (1− q01T)HLR2 ].
At the second round, each player has to update her belief based on the outcome of
the first round. Again, we take the viewpoint of player 1. Still, player 1 chooses T at
any θ1 such that θ1T − θ1U ≥ maxq[qH
TU
1 + (1− q)HTU1 ]. Yet now the set of available q
becomes smaller: for each µ1 ∈ ∆(Θ2× A2) with µ1(∑12,∆(p)) = 1 and margΘ2µ1 = p2, the





1 }. In general, for n ≥ 0,













1 + (1− qn2L)HTU1 ], (11)













2 + (1− qn1T)HLR2 ], (13)
with q0ik = 0 for each i and k.
Since each qnik ∈ [0, 1], it is clear that they are bounded. We show the monotonicity part,
i.e., qn+1ik ≥ q
n
ik for each i, k and n, inductively. Since f1 is continuous and has the full
support, it is clear that q11T = p1[θ1T − θ1U ≥ H
TU
1 ] ≥ 0 = q01T. Similarly, it can be seen




ik for all i and k. Now
we show that it also holds for n + 1. Since

















by the inductive hypothesis, i.e., qn2R ≥ q
n−1













1 . Hence E
TU
n ⊆ ETUn+1 i.e., qn1T ≤ q
n+1
1T . Similarly, we can see that
qnik ≤ q
n+1
ik for all i and k. By induction, we have shown the first statement. Hence, there





It is easy to see that each qn1k (q
n
2k) is the measure of the area under or above some line
on the θ1T-θ1U (θ2L-θ2R) space, as shown in Figure 2. Geometrically, the first statement
implies that the intercepts of those boundary lines converge to a point “in the middle”.
6Note that since (1− q01U)H
LR




2 ≥ HLR1 = q01T H
LR
2 + (1− q01T)H
LR
2 , it follows that q
1
2L +
q2R ≤ 1, i.e., q12L ≤ 1− q12R. This outcome will be generalized in the following.
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Next, we show that qn1T + q
n
1U ≤ 1 and qn2L + qn2R ≤ 1 for each n ∈ N. The statement






2 . Suppose it holds for some n ∈ N.
Since qn2L + q
n





Similarly, qn+12L + q
n+1
2R ≤ 1. Here we have shown the first statement for 2× 2 games.
Now we show how to generalize the method. Consider a general game 〉G, (Θj)j∈I , p〈.
For each i ∈ I and k, t ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, let Ekti,1 = {θi ∈ Θi : θik − θit ≥ H
kt
i } and Eki,1 =
∩Kis=1Eksi,1 = ∩s 6=kEksi,1. As in 2 × 2 cases, it is easy to see that q1ik = pi(Eki,1). Also, since
Etki,1 = {θi ∈ Θi : θik − θit ≤ H
kt
i } and Hkti ≤ H
kt
i , pi(Ekti,1 ∩ Etki,1) = 0 due to the absolute















i,1) = pi(∪Esi,1) ≤ 1.
For n ≥ 1, for each i ∈ I and k, t ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, let






qj(aj)[ui(ait, a−i)− ui(aik, a−i)]}, (14)
where the maximum is taken over the intervals determined by qn−1jt ’s. The set E
kt
i,n contains
all θi’s where player i should choose aik against ait (again, the boundary does not matter).





It can be seen that qnik = pi(E
k
i,n). By the inductive hypothesis, the feasible region for
(qj(aj))aj∈Aj (j ∈ I) is non-increasing from n− 1 to n, hence the maximum value is non-
increasing. Therefore, Ekti,n ⊆ Ekti,n+1, and consequently qnik ≤ q
n+1
ik . Since p(E
k
i,n ∩ Eti,n) = 0,
∑Kik=1 q
n
ik ≤ 1 for each n ≥ 0. Therefore, the statement holds for general cases.
Proposition 2. q∗ik ≤ qik for each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}.
Proof. Suppose that q∗ik > qik for some i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}. Then for each si : Θi →
Ai such that (θi, si(θi)) ∈ ∑∞i,∆(p) for each θi ∈ Θi, pi(s
−1
i (aik)) ≥ q
∗
ik > qik, which is
contradictory to Theorem 1.
4.2.2 Conditions for ∆(p)-rationalizability→ QRE
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that for each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, q∗ik, the infimum of the
probability that action aik is used in the outcome of the ∆(p)-rationalization process, is no
larger than q
ik
, the smallest probability that the action is used in all QREs. Our purpose
now is to find conditions under which q∗ik = qik, or, equivalently, the following statement
holds.
Statement 1. For each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, q∗ik represents the probability that action aik is
used in some QRE.
Example 6 in the previous section shows that Statement 1 does not hold uncondition-
ally. We use the game in Table 7 and discuss two cases where the conjecture holds and
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does not, respectively. The discussion will give an intuition about the conditions under
which the statement holds.
Case 1 (Statement 1 holds). As in the proof of Proposition 1, we assume that HTU1 =
γ1 − α1 ≥ HTU1 = δ1 − β1 and H
LR
2 = β2 − α2 ≥ HLR2 = δ2 − γ2.
Consider an arbitrary (θi, ai) ∈ ∑∞i,∆(p). Since (θi, ai) has not been eliminated in the
∆(p)-rationalization procedure, ai is optimal under θi against on a belief (qj)j 6=i ∈ ∏j 6=i ∆(Aj)
of the distributions of others’ choices such that for each j 6= i and k ∈ {1, ..., Kj}, qj(akj) ≥
q∗jk. In other words, if we use B = (Bi)i∈I to denote the operator on subsets E ⊆ Θ× A
such that Bi(E) is the set of (θi, ai) ∈ Ei which can be supported by some belief µi in Def-
inition 2, then B(∏i∈I ∑
∞
i,∆(p)) = ∏i∈I ∑
∞
i,∆(p). This is called the fixed-point property of the
outcome of a rationalization procedure (see Pearce [24], Battigalli and Bonanno [3]).
Return to the game in Table 7. The fixed-point property implies that at the limit,







q∗1U = p1[θ1T − θ1U ≤ q∗2LH
TU
1 + (1− q∗2L)HTU1 ], (16)







q∗2R = p2[θ2L − θ2R ≤ q∗1T H
LR
2 + (1− q∗1T)HLR2 ]. (18)
Is there any QRE where player 1 using T with probability q∗1T? The answer is yes. Con-
sider (q1, q2) ∈ ∆(A1)× ∆(A2) such that
q1(T) = q∗1T, q1(U) = 1− q∗1T, q2(L) = 1− q∗2R, q2(R) = q∗2R.
This is a QRE. Indeed, note that when q2(L) = 1− q∗2R, at each θ1 ∈ EU1 (1− q∗2R, q∗2R) :=




1 ] player 1 choose U. By 15, p1(E
U
1 (1− q∗2R, q∗2R)) =
1 − q∗1T. Also, at each θ2 ∈ EL2 (q∗1T, 1 − q∗1T) := [θ2L − θ2R ≥ q∗1T H
LR
2 + (1 − q∗1T)H
LR
2 ],
player 2 chooses L, and it follows from equation(18) that p2(EL2 (q
∗
1T, 1− q∗1T)) = 1− q∗2R.
In a similar manner, we can show that each q∗ik is the probability that player i uses the
action k in some QRE.
Case 2 (Statement 1 does not hold). Assume that HTU1 = δ1 − β1 ≥ HTU1 = γ1 − α1
and, still, HLR2 = β2 − α2 ≥ HLR2 = δ2 − γ2. At the limit, it should be







q∗1U = p1[θ1T − θ1U ≤ q∗2RH
TU
1 + (1− q∗2R)HTU1 ], (20)







q∗2R = p2[θ2L − θ2R ≤ q∗1T H
LR
2 + (1− q∗1T)HLR2 ]. (22)
Is there any QRE where player 1 using T with probability q∗1T? Not necessarily so. To
be specific, when q∗2L + q
∗




1U = 1), the answer is yes.
18
Yet if q∗2L + q
∗




1U < 1), as illustrated in Figure 5, the
answer is definitely no. To see this, without loss of generality, suppose that in some QRE
q = (q1, q2), player 1 uses T with probability q1(T) = q∗1T. To fulfill this, by equation
(19), q2(L) = q∗2L, which implies that q1(U) = q
∗
1U, and consequently it leads to q2(R) =




2R < 1, not even a probability
distribution.
Figure 5: ∆(p) rationalization procedure does not converge to any QRE.
One may notice that the difference is at the pattern of the influence relations between
actions. Indeed, for each i and k, the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure is based on recur-
sively determining the area in Θi where θik − θit(t 6= k) is bigger than the maximum
value generated by the infimum of q−i,s’s in the previous stage. To find the maximum
value, one needs to make as small as possible the probabilities of the opponent’s actions
which is associated with a value strictly less than Hkti . Those actions of the opponent are
the “marginal” ones determining the value of qnik for each n. If we want one action aik
to be used by the probability q∗ik, then every action ajt directly or indirectly marginal for
it should be used by q∗jt. Since all those are infimums, whether they are in some QRE
depends on whether the remaining actions can decompose the residue and form an equi-
librium.
We now formalize the idea in 2-person games. The condition will be formalized in
Theorem 2. The generalization will be discussed in Section 4.2.3.
Consider a 2-person game G = 〈A1, A2, u1, u2〉. For each i = 1, 2, we define a corre-
spondence φi : Ai × Ai ⇒ A−i such that for each (aik, ait) ∈ Ai × Ai, φi(aik, ait) = {a−i ∈
A−i : ui(ait, a−i)− ui(aik, a−i) < H
kt
i }. We have some straightforward results for φi’s.
Lemma 1. Consider i ∈ {1, 2} and aik, ait ∈ Ai with k 6= t. Then either φi(aik, ait) =
φi(ait, aik) = ∅, or φi(aik, ait) ∪ φi(ait, aik) = A−i.
Proof. If φi(aik, ait) = ∅, then ui(ait, a−i)− ui(aik, a−i) = H
kt
i for each a−i ∈ A−i, which
implies that ui(aik, a−i)− ui(ait, a−i) is constant on A−i, i.e., φi(ait, aik) = ∅.
Suppose that φi(aik, ait) 6= ∅. Note that φi(aik, ait) can never be A−i, since there is some
a−i ∈ A−i such that ui(ait, a−i) − ui(aik, a−i) = H
kt




i . Since ui(aik, a−i) − ui(ait, a−i) = −(ui(ait, a−i) − ui(aik, a−i)), it follows that
(A−i \ φi(aik, ait)) ⊆ φi(ait, aik), and consequently φi(aik, ait) ∪ φi(ait, aik) = A−i.
Based on φi, we define a correspondence Φi : Ai ⇒ A−i such that Φi(aik) = ∪Kit=1φi(aik, ait)
for each i ∈ I and aik ∈ Ai. Informally, Φi(aik) is the set of “marginal” actions of player−i
for aik since the infimums of the probabilities that those actions are used determines the
area in Θi where aik is optimal.7 Φi defines a relational structure on Ai. An action aik ∈ Ai
is called non-serial iff Φ(aik) = ∅; it is called indirectly non-serial iff for some b−i ∈ Φ(aik),
Φ(b−i) = ∅.8 We have the following result.
Lemma 2. If for some i ∈ {1, 2}, aik ∈ Ai is non-serial, then each action in Ai is non-serial, and
consequently every action in the game is eventually non-serial.
Proof. If aik is non-serial, then for each ai` ∈ Ai and each a−i ∈ A−i, ui(ai`, a−i)−ui(aik, a−i) =
Hkti , which implies that for each ait, ais ∈ Ai, ui(ait, a−i)− ui(ais, a−i) is constant on A−i.
Hence Φi(ai) = ∅ for each ai ∈ Ai, and consequently every action in the game is eventu-
ally non-serial.
We call a game serial iff no action is non-serial.
It can be seen that (Φ1, Φ2) defines a directed graph (⇒, A1 ∪ A2) such that for each
aik, ajt ∈ A1 ∪ A2, aik ⇒ ajt iff ajt ∈ Φi(aik). For example, in Figure 6 (1) it is the directed
graph for the game in Example 5, and in Figure 6 (2) is that for Example 6.
Figure 6: The graphs for two games
For each aik, ajt ∈ A1 ∪ A2, ajt is reachable from aik iff there are ai0,k0 , ai1,k1 , ..., aiN ,kN ∈
A1 ∪ A2(N ≥ 0) such that aik = ai0,k0 ⇒ ai1,k1 ⇒ ... ⇒ aiN ,kN = ajt. Note that aik is
reachable from itself (i.e., when N = 0). We use C(aik) to denote the set of all actions
reachable from aik.
Also, we define an operator L on 2A1∪A2 as follows: for each B ⊆ A1 ∪ A2, L(B) :=
{aj ∈ A1 ∪ A2 : Φj(aj) ⊆ B}. Informally, L(B) is the set of actions whose marginal influ-
encers are in B. We can repeatedly apply L to a set, and we define L∞(B) = ∪∞n=0Ln(B);
7We call them marginal since their roles are similar to that of the marginal consumers/ producers in com-
petitive market equilibrium models, who determines the market price.
8The names are borrowed from modal logic, a field devoted to the research of relational structures. See,
for example, Chellas [8] and Battigalli and Bonanno [3].
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here, we stipulate that L0(B) = B. L∞(B) is the set of all actions directly and indirectly
being influenced by and influencing actions in B.
Theorem 2. Let aik ∈ Ai. If one of the following condition is satisfied, then q∗ik = qik:
(1) aik is eventually non-serial, or
(2) L∞(C(aik)) 6= A1 ∪ A2.
Proof. First, suppose that aik is non-serial. It follows that for each t ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, ui(ait, a−i)−
ui(aik, a−i) = H
kt
i for each a−i ∈ A−i. Therefore, for each n ≥ 1, Ekt1,n = Ekt1 := [θik − θit ≥




1 ). Also, it is clear that in every QRE, aik
is used with probability pi(∩Kis=1Ekt1 ). Hence q∗ik = qik. Similarly, if aik is indirectly non-
serial, since the probabilities of their marginal actions will be fixed from the first round, qnik
is fixed for each n ≥ 2, and in every QRE aik is used by q2ik. Hence we still have q∗ik = qik.
Now suppose that aik is not eventually non-serial andL∞(C(aik)) 6= A1∪ A2. We define
the following symbols: for each j ∈ {1, 2},
Aoj := Aj ∩ L∞(C(aik)), A′j = Aj \ L∞(C(aik)).
It is clear that for each j ∈ I, Aoj and A′j form a partition of Aj. We have the following
observation.
Observation 2. When aik is not eventually non-serial, L∞(C(aik)) 6= A1 ∪ A2 implies that
A′j 6= ∅ for each j = 1, 2.
To see this, suppose that A′j = ∅ for some j ∈ {1, 2}. Then A′−j 6= ∅ since A′1 ∪ A′2 =
(A1 ∪ A2) \L∞(C(aik)). Yet since no a−j ∈ A′−j is non-serial, there should be some bj ∈ Aj
marginal to some a−j ∈ A′−j which is not in L∞(C(aik)), otherwise by definition A′−j = ∅.
Yet since A′j = ∅, bj ∈ L∞(C(aik)), and consequently a−j ∈ L∞(C(aik)), which implies
that A′−j = ∅, a contradiction. Therefore, A
′
j 6= ∅ for both j = 1, 2.
Now we return to the proof of Theorem 2. To show q∗ik = qik, we show that Statement 1
holds here, i.e., there is some QRE where aik is used by probability q∗ik. Combining it with
Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain q∗ik = qik. Consider q = (q1, q2) ∈ ∆(A1)× ∆(A2) defined
as follows:
(a) For each ajt ∈ Aojt for each j ∈ {1, 2}, let qj(ajt) = q∗jt.
(b) Since we have shown above that A′j 6= ∅ for both j = 1, 2, we can define
Bj = {rj ∈ [0, 1]
A′j : ∑
ajs∈A′j
rj(ajs) = 1− ∑
t:ajt∈Aoj
q∗jt and rj(ajs) ≥ q∗js for each s with ajs ∈ A′j}
By Proposition 1, each Bj is well defined. It is clear that each Bj is compact and convex, so
is B := B1 × B2. Now consider g : B → B such that for each j ∈ {1, 2}, r ∈ B, and s such
that ajs ∈ A′j,




where Esj is a measurable function from [0, 1]
A−j to 2Θj such that for each γ ∈ [0, 1]A−j ,
Esj (γ) = ∩
Kj
t=1{θi ∈ Θi : θis − θit ≥ ∑
a−i∈A−i
γ(a−j)[ui(ait, a−i)− ui(aik, a−i)]}
By our assumptions about pj, j = 1, 2, g is continuous. It follows from Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem that g has a fixed point r∗. Then for each ajs ∈ A′js, we let qj(ajs) = r∗js. It
can be seen that q is a QRE in which aik is used by probability q∗ik.
Corollary 1. If |Q(G, p)| = 1 and either (1) or (2) in Theorem 2 is satisfied, the QRE is the only
∆(p)-rationalizable outcome.
The condition provided in Theorem 2 is sufficient. It is not necessary when the QRE
is unique. To see this, consider games in Examples 3 and 6 in Section 3.2.9 For each
game and each aik, L∞(C(aik)) = A1 ∪ A2. However, the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure
converges to the QRE in Example 3 but fails to do so in Example 6. However, when there
are multiple QREs, the conditions in Theorem 2 is also necessary. We have the following
result.
Proposition 3. If |Q(G, p)| > 1 and both conditions in Theorem 2 are violated, q∗ik < qik for
each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}.
Proof. Since no action is eventually non-serial and L∞(C(aik)) = A1 ∪ A2, it follows that
for each distinct π, π′ ∈ Q(G, p), each j ∈ I and t ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, πj(ajt) 6= π′j(ajt). There-
fore, ∑s∈{1,...,Kj} qjs < 1 for each j ∈ I. Applying the fixed-point property as in Case
2 (Statement 1 does not hold) above, it follows that if q∗ik = qik for some i ∈ I and
k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}, it follows from L∞(C(aik)) = A1 ∪ A2 that all q∗jt = qjt, which does not
form a QRE. Hence q∗ik < qik for each i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, ..., Ki}.
4.2.3 The strictness of the conditions and a full convergence
Theorem 2 gives a sufficient condition for a ∆(p)-rationalization process “locally” con-
verging to some QRE (locally means that we only focus on an individual action aik); it is
also necessary when the QRE is unique by Proposition 3. Now we face a problem: How
“large” is the set of games satisfying condition (1) or (2) in Theorem 2? Or, how “special”
such a game can be? This problem is also relevant to generalizing Theorem 2 to n-person
games.
It is clear that condition (1) is quite strict and it does not hold for generic games. Indeed,
as noted in Lemma 2, one action aik’s non-seriality implies that the payoff matrix of player
i has order 1. Condition (2) seems more general. In a 2× 2 game, it implies a directed
9Strictly speaking, Example 3 does not satisfy the assumption in this subsection since f j’s there do not
have full supports. Yet after reflecting on the proof of Theorem 2, one may notice that the full-support
assumption can be relaxed; all results in this subsection hold as well if the support of each fi is large
enough to rationalize each action of i. Therefore, Example 3 still serves as a good illustration here and
does not need any essential change.
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graph as in Figure 6 (1). Many games intensively studied in the literature satisfy the
condition, for example, the asymmetric game of chicken (Goeree et al. [12], p.25-26),
coordination games (Goeree et al. [12], p.29-30, Anderson et al. [1], Turocy [30]), and
many (but not all) dominance-solvable games. However, it is impossible for a Matching-
Pennies style game (MP, Ochs [22]) to satisfy condition (2). For a general 2-person game,
we have the following result.
Lemma 3. Suppose that aik ∈ Ai is not eventually non-serial. Then if it satisfies condition (2) in
Theorem 2, it satisfies the following two conditions:
(A) |Φi(aik)| = 1, and
(B) Φ−i(Φi(aik)) = {aik}.
Proof. For (A), since aik is serial, |Φi(aik)| ≥ 1. Suppose that |Φi(aik)| > 1 and let b−i, b′−i ∈
Φi(aik) with b−i 6= b′−i. Then Lemma 1 (1) implies that Φ−i(b−i) ∪ Φ−i(b′−i) = Ai, and
consequently Ai ⊆ L∞(C(aik)). By Observation 2, it follows that L∞(C(aik)) = A1 ∪ A2,
a contradiction. Hence, |Φi(aik)| = 1.
For (B), let Φi(aik) = {b−i}. Suppose that there is some ais ∈ Φ−i(b−i) with s 6=
k. By Lemma 1 (1), it follows that Φi(aik) ∪ Φi(ais) = A−i, and consequently A−i ⊆
L∞(C(aik)). By Observation 2, it follows that L∞(C(aik)) = A1 ∪ A2, a contradiction.
Hence, Φ−i(Φi(aik)) = {aik}.
Lemma 3 shows that condition (2) in Theorem 2 can be quite strict in general 2-person
games. It actually implies that most games do not statisfy the condition. We have the
following result.
Proposition 4. Consider a 2-person serial game with |Ai| ≥ 2 for each i = 1, 2 and at least one
player has more than two actions. Then no action satisfies condition (2) in Theorem 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that player 1 has more than two actions, and
a1 ∈ A1 satisfies condition (2). By Lemma 3, Φ1(a1) = {a2} for some a2 ∈ A2. So
C(a1) = {a1, a2}. Let b1, c1 ∈ A1 \ {a1} be distinct. By Lemma 1, Φ1(b1) ∪Φ1(c1) = A2.
So a2 ∈ Φ1(b1) or a2 ∈ Φ1(c1). Hence {b1, c1} ∩ L(C(a1)) 6= ∅.
By Lemma 1, {b1, c1} ⊆ Φ2(b2) for each b2 ∈ A2 with b2 6= a2 (since |A2| ≥ 2, such b2
exists), and consequently b2 ∈ L2(C(a1)). Hence A2 ∩ L∞(C(a1)) = A2. By Observation
2, L∞(C(a1)) = A1 ∪ A2, a contradiction.
Proposition 4 implies that condition (2) in Theorem 2 cannot be satisfied in a generic n-
person game (n > 2). Even if each player has only two actions, since Φi(aik) now contains
profiles of actions in A−i = ∏j 6=i Aj and |A−i| > 2, through an argument similar to the
proof of Proposition 4, it can be seen that no action satisfies condition (2) in Theorem 2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we define ∆(p)-rationalization procedure, a special case of Battigalli and
Siniscalchi [5]’s ∆-rationalization procedure, to characterize robust outcomes in large
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populations, and we investigate the relationship between ∆(p)-rationalizable outcomes
and MP’s QREs. Our results here have two implications. First, in a non-trivial class of
2× 2 games, which is characterized in Theorem 2 and Proposition 3, QREs are informa-
tive for determining robust outcomes. Second, however, in general, when QRE is not
unique, robust outcomes derived from the ∆(p)-rationalization procedure can be larger
than the QRE, which makes the former a better benchmark to estimate robust outcomes
in large populations.10
References
[1] Anderson, SP, Goeree JK, Holt CA (2001) Minimum-effect coordination games:
stochastic potential and logit equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior 34: 174-199.
[2] Aumann R, Brandenburger A (1995) Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium.
Econometrica 63: 1161-1180.
[3] Battigalli P, Bonnano G (1999) Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic
foundation of game theory. Research in Economics 53: 149-225.
[4] Battigalli P, Freidenberg A, Siniscalchi M (2020) Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning
About Strategic Uncertainty. Manuscript.
[5] Battigalli P, Siniscalchi M (2003) Rationalization and incomplete information. Ad-
vances in Theoretical Economics 3, Article 3.
[6] Bergemann D, Morris S (2005) Robust mechanism design. Econometrica 73: 1771-1813.
[7] Bernheim BD (1984) Rationalizable strategic behavior. Econometrica 52: 1007-1028.
[8] Chellas BF (1980) Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press.
[9] Dekel E, Siniscalchi M (2015) Epistemic game theory. In: Young PH, Zamir S (eds)
Handbooks of game theory with economic applications, vol 4. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp
619–702
[10] Goeree JK, Holt CA (2004) A model of noisy introspection. Games and Economic Be-
havior 46: 365-382.
[11] Goeree JK, Holt CA, Palfrey TR. 2005. Regular quantal response equilibrium. Experi-
mental Economics 8: 347-367.
[12] Goeree JK, Holt CA, Palfrey TR (2016) Quantal Response Equilibrium. Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
[13] Harsanyi J (1967-68) Games of incomplete information played by Bayesian players,
Parts I-III. Management Science 14: 159-182, 320-334, 486-502.
10The condition for the uniqueness of QRE is not fully studied yet. See Melo [21] for the latest progress in
this direction. It is still hard to estimate the size of the set of game-distribution pairs with unique QRE.
24
[14] Harsanyi J (1973) Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for
mixed-strategy equilibrium points. International Journal of Game Theory 2: 1-23.
[15] Haile PA, Hortaçsu A, Kosenok G. 2008. On the empirical content of quantal response
equilibrium. American Economic Review 98: 180-200.
[16] Kosenkova L (2019) Nonparametric inference in asymmetric first-price auctions with
k-rationalizable beliefs. Working paper.
[17] Luce R, Suppes P (1965) Preference, utility, and subjective probability. In Handbook of
Mathematical Psychology, vol 3, ed. by Luce R, Bush R, and Galanter E. Wiley.
[18] McFadden D (1973) Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In Fron-
tiers of Econometrics, P. Zarembka ed. Academic Press, New York.
[19] McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games.
Games and Economic Behavior 10: 6-38.
[20] McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR (1996) A statistical theory of equilibrium in games. Japanese
Economic Review 47: 186-209.
[21] Melo E (2021) On the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria and its application
to network games. Working paper.
[22] Ochs J (1995) Games with unique mixed strategy equilibria: an experimental study.
Games and Economic Behavior 10: 174-189.
[23] Perea A (2012) Epistemic game theory: reasoning and choice. Cambridge University
Press.
[24] Pearce D (1984) Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection.
Econometrica 52: 1029-1050.
[25] Polak B (1999) Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, and common knowledge
of rationality. Econometrica 67: 673-676.
[26] Rosenthal RW (1979) Sequences of games with varying opponents. Econometrica 47:
1353-1366.
[27] Rubinstein A (1991) Comments on the interpretation of game theory. Econometrica
59: 909-924.
[28] Selten R (1975) A reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in
extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory 4: 25-55.
[29] Tan T, Werlang SRC (1988) The Bayesian foundation of solution concepts of games.
Journal of Economic Theory 45: 370-391.
[30] Turocy TL (2005) A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal re-
sponse equilibrium correspondence. Games and Economic Behavior 51: 242-263.
25
